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One of the key concerns of the eSCAPE Project is the exploration of the 
relationship between art and the design of virtual spaces. One rationale 
underlying this motivation is that both endeavours - artistic production and the 
design of virtual spaces - are not necessarily bound by ‘normal’ conceptions and 
perceptions of spatiality and representation.1 In the case of artistic production, 
the conventions of production can depart from, even violate, ‘normal’ 
conceptions of spatiality and representation and, indeed, very often this is their 
point. In the case of virtual spaces the affordances offered by the electronic 
medium means that, to a significant degree, the ordinary constraints of space – 
and time – can be transcended. However, this is to state a set of problems rather 
than offer a solution.  
The bringing together of these artistic traditions with both technological 
development and the understanding of the social represents in itself a major 
methodological challenge. In this chapter we will set out some of the background 
considerations which bear upon the connection between art and technology and 
how they have been worked through in the eSCAPE Project. In significant 
respects it is a retrospective document reflecting upon work of the project to 
date.2 In particular, it will set the scene for the more substantive considerations 
that entered into the design of the electronic landscapes which are discussed in 
Deliverables 4.1 and 4.2 and the construction of the technologies reported in 
D5.1. 
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1 Of course, it is a moot point as to just what ‘normal’ conceptions of spatiality and representation might be 
given that these are, to a degree, culturally and historically variable. However, this does not detract from 
the point being made. See Ihde (1990) for a Phenomenological approach to the ways in which ‘normal’ 
conceptions and perceptions have been mediated by scientific knowledge. 
2 This chapter draws on the working paper Hughes, Crabtree and Murray (1999). 
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To begin the discussion we will review some general considerations relevant 
to the evaluation of artistic productions for system design. 
 
General considerations 
One of the problems of characterising the relationship between art and the design 
of technologies is that, typically, the question is posed as a general and highly 
abstract one rather than one to consider in an everyday practical sense.  This is 
often conveyed by capitalising Art and Technology so inviting us to address the 
issue as a deep and fundamental one about profound and sublime matters. It also 
suggests that what we are seeking is a single answer, a truth, which would 
express the relationship between these two domains. While having a role to play 
in developing an understanding of Art and Technology we would argue that this 
construction of the problem fails to meet the need of those involved in the 
construction of new electronic landscapes. Essentially, in our experience we have 
found this way of posing the issue unhelpful for the purposes of design and in the 
rest of this section we wish to consider some of the reasons for this view. 
Some concerns about general formulations 
The general concerns about considering the relation between Art and Technology 
as a theoretical issue is a broader worry about the problematic nature of general 
formulations in the everyday practical work of design. However, the problem of 
generalisation here is even more acute as the general formulation of the 
relationship presupposes that Art and Technology each denote, relatively 
unproblematically, homogeneous domains. However, while it is always possible 
to formulate some general characterisation of what the various arts have in 
common - just as it is always possible to formulate some general description of 
‘work’, ‘leisure’, ‘democracy’, etc. - this will leave open for further 
consideration and deliberation ‘just what’ the general characterisation amounts to 
in connection with specific kinds of artistic productions. The general formulation 
presupposes that, despite their variety and multitude of definitions, ‘the arts’ 
have some common quality or property which makes them what they are and not, 
say, scientific endeavours, sports, or even technological endeavours.  
There are further considerations immediately relevant to this point. Our 
complaint against general concepts and characterisations such as this is not 
against general concepts as such. After all, in ordinary language we sensibly use 
them. However, their sense is contextually furnished in that what we say, the 
sense of what the meaning is, depends upon the occasions of use. For example, 
‘British’ can be construed as a general category but the specific sense of what it 
might mean depends upon the circumstances in which the term is uttered. It 
might mean one thing if a passport is being applied for, another if responding to a 
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query as to where one is from, and yet another if discussing political devolution.1  
This is not to say that the different uses are unconnected; it is to suggest that the 
connections between them are, in Wittgenstein’s terms (Wittgenstein, 1958), 
more of a ‘family resemblance’ than due to any common property from which 
the term gets its meaning. By this he means that the sense of general terms within 
ordinary language derives from the many interconnections that may be found in 
much the same way that the members of a family may show various similarities 
with other members. A nose may look like a mother’s, while the ears look more 
like those of the father, hair colour shared by cousins, and so on, rather than any 
one all-encompassing alikeness.  
Once again, we need to reaffirm that the point we are making here is not one 
against the use of general formulations but, rather, to recognise that their sense, 
their import, is contextually furnished and that when we ask such general 
concepts to perform analytic work as if their sense were independent of some 
context, then we run into difficulties.2 If we apply these principles to the 
category ‘Art’, then they recommend that we do not try to look for common 
elements which, as it were, brings together all the members of the collection as if 
they had some thing, some one thing, in common.  
Wittgenstein’s remarks were addressed to philosophical accounts of meaning 
and served as reminders to philosophers of the sense which ordinary usage 
already has. One of his main points was that when philosophers try to detach a 
word from its ordinary usage they tend to produce non-sense.3 While 
Wittgenstein’s remarks were directed to philosopher’s attempt to provide 
theories of language, they also have relevance to our own concerns about the way 
in which the general question as to the relationship between art and technology is 
formulated. 
The variety of artistic production 
The presupposition that the category ‘art’ denotes some property which all 
members of the collection possess has the problem of formulating what this 
common property might be in light of the variety of the things which can, and 
are, included as art. Poetry, drama, sculpture, painting, novel writing, ballet, 
opera, music are among the activities conventionally nominated as among the 
arts. But what about architecture, film, rock music, folk song and folk dancing, 
calligraphy not to mention the many ‘hybrids’ such as body sculpture and even 
interactive art? Do we include these as arts? If not, why not? 
                                                 
1 See Schegloff, 1972 for a discussion of matters relevant to this point. 
2 This is essentially the point that Wittgenstein makes in his attack on philosophy and its predilection for 
taking words out of their ‘home’ context of ordinary usage such that their sense is lost. Garfinkel (1967) 
and Sacks (1995) make a similar point in connection with ‘natural language’ and its relationship to 
sociology.  
3 Wittgenstein does not mean here that they produce unintelligible gibberish, but that the accounts of the 
words would have no use and distort the sense they have in ordinary language.  
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These questions nicely illustrate some of the difficulties alluded to in the 
previous subsection. Which artistic activity are we to take as the inspiration for 
system design? Of course, what is often at stake here is not so much an issue of 
whether or not folk song or rock music, say, are rightly described as arts as if this 
was a matter of finding the correct way to describe these activities. A matter, so 
to speak, of discovering qualities in the activities which have been hitherto 
unseen or unrecognised. Rather, what is going on is an argument about how these 
activities should be valued and appraised. In the course of such arguments no 
doubt reference can be made to various qualities of the product and / or the 
performers, such as their skill, their artistry, their popularity, their innovative 
character, and so on. However, the point is that the issue here is not so much a 
matter of discovery as persuasion. A matter of persuading others that calligraphy 
or rock music, or whatever, have qualities that ought to be taken seriously and 
ranked alongside other activities which are taken seriously in this way. Artistic 
appreciation and evaluation is inextricably bound up with appraisal; that is, with 
making judgements about the relative worth or merit of some production or 
artefact.  
The search for common properties 
While the previous section has presented significant reservations about an 
overly general consideration of the relationship between Art and Technology we 
still wish to acknowledge the promise of a generic set of lessons. In this section 
we wish to consider what properties of artistic endeavour we may wish to exploit 
in the development of new technologies and how sustainable such an migration 
may be in practice; leaving on one side the issue of which to include or exclude 
as arts that arises from any general relationship we set out with technology. 
Clearly, if we are looking for some common quality that Art possesses, then this 
would have to be, to a significant degree, independent of the medium; 
independent, that is, of whether the art was embodied in painting, in sound, or in 
the written or spoken word. This brings us to the techniques and properties of art 
itself and a consideration of how we may migrate these properties to the world of 
technological development. The first of these surrounds the general issue of 
aesthetics.  
Aesthetics 
Perhaps the major candidate for a common quality underlying art is to be found 
in the notion of aesthetics. Simply put, aesthetics is that branch of intellectual 
endeavour concerned with inquiries into beauty or taste. However, and not 
surprisingly, putting it simply does not really take us very far given that it can 
have philosophical, psychological, linguistic and social dimensions, and each of 
these introducing manifold complexities. 
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It was probably Plato’s theory of forms which placed on the agenda of 
aesthetics the notion that aesthetic terms, such as ‘beauty’, ‘ugliness’, when 
applied to artefacts or to aspects of nature gained their meaning and sense from 
their reference to qualities which inhered in the object or the scene; qualities 
which provoked a particular and distinctive experience in the viewer. More 
recently, this idea of a distinctive experience was talked about in terms of the 
‘aesthetic attitude’. This is held to be a style of perception concerned neither with 
facts or with practical use but with the qualities of the contemplative experience 
itself and works of art, (or, indeed, natural objects), human creations designed to 
stimulate this kind of attention (Beardsley, 1958; Scruton, 1974).  
What is fairly clear is that the attempts to identify a quality, such as ‘beauty’ 
or ‘sublime feelings’ as the defining characteristics of art failed to carry the day. 
While not dismissing aesthetic expressions as senseless, it was clear that their 
meaning could not depend on reference to some substantive quality that objects 
might possess. However, the demise of this view also seemed to deliver the 
quietus to the notion that aesthetic judgements could be objective giving 
credence to the view that aesthetic judgements were subjective and akin to 
expressions of taste worth hardly any more than expressions of taste regarding 
ice cream or pints of beer (Ayer, 1936). Aesthetic judgements, in other words, 
are subjective expressions of personal preference and no more than that.  
One serious implication of this view is that it makes no sense to compare 
aesthetic preferences other than to say ‘I like this’ and ‘You like that’. In the 
absence of any objective quality against which to measure aesthetic judgements 
they can only be matters of personal taste or preference and not rankable in any 
sensible way. Accordingly, there can be no experts in artistic judgements since 
there is no expertise to acquire other than the capacity to express personal taste.  
Not surprisingly, such a view has its stern critics and, what is more, seems to 
fly in the face of the fact that throughout recorded history human beings have 
discriminated among artistic artefacts in terms of their quality and, what is more, 
such discriminations have often become institutionalised and presented as 
exemplars of aesthetic achievement. In which case, it is difficult to see such 
achievements as simply the exercise of personal tastes. Something more must be 
at work; the task is to specify what this ‘something more’ can be.  
It is arguments such as this which direct attention to the social dimension of 
artistic production and seeing the aesthetic as rooted in society and culture. 
The social shaping of the arts 
One of the hallmarks of artistic production, and one which stands out after even 
only a slight acquaintance, is the variations in styles. And this is so for most if 
not all of the arts, painting, sculpture, poetry, novels, the theatre, and so on. 
Accordingly, it should be no surprise that efforts have been made (from a variety 
of human studies disciplines),  to periodise and describe the various movements 
in artistic creation relating these to features in the wider culture, religion, politics 
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and even economic organisation. Indeed, from a sociological or history of ideas 
point of view, the character of art has much to do with the nature of the society 
and the culture in which it is embedded.  
As Norman (1998) points out, there are aspects of art which are a product of 
European history and the changing role and status of the artist in society. The 
relative autonomy of art and the artist is, historically speaking, a relatively recent 
innovation. Prior to this, artistic creation and production was treated very much 
as a craft and artists, in terms of social status, treated very much as artisans. Until 
the eighteenth century the peak of artistic creation was seen as the Classical Age 
of Greece and, to some extent, that of Ancient Rome and which could never be 
superseded.  
However, it was in the eighteenth century that the attempt was made to treat 
as a whole painting, the theatre, music, literature, poetry and dance. During the 
Enlightenment, especially in France and Germany, distinctions were starting to 
be made between the ‘fine arts’ of music, poetry, painting, sculpture and dance 
and mechanical skills, a domain to which the arts had hitherto been consigned. In 
Germany, Baumgarten (who invented the term ‘aesthetics’ in the 1750s), Moses 
Mendelssohn, and Immanuel Kant placed a theory of beauty and the arts on a par 
with the theory of truth and goodness and established the arts as a distinct area of 
philosophical inquiry (Brewer, 1997). 
Though these ideas did not dwell exclusively on artefacts but included 
discussion of the way in which nature could provoke feelings akin to those 
evoked by a work of art, they effectively created a category of what Burke called 
‘works of the imagination and the elegant arts’.1 Of course, and as the 
Enlightenment philosophers recognised, ideas and writings about beauty and 
sublimity dated back to at least antiquity, but until this time, and as indicated 
earlier, the arts had not been given this special collective identity. 
The reasons for this shift in the characterisation of the arts are, not 
surprisingly, complex. According to Brewer (1997) the rethinking of knowledge 
provoked by the scientific discoveries of Galileo and Newton drew a distinction 
between the arts and the sciences. Equally important were changes in the arts 
themselves. In the eighteenth century they ceased to be the preserve of royal 
courts and moved out toward a larger public: 
This more commercial and less courtly culture was to be found in coffee houses in Venice, 
Amsterdam, London, Paris and Vienna, clubs and reading societies in Germany, academies in 
provincial France, literary and philosophical societies in provincial Britain, commercial 
theatres of London, Paris and Lisbon, art dealers’ shops and auction houses in Naples, Rome 
and Amsterdam and at professional concerts performed in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Berlin 
and Vienna (Brewer, 1979: xvii). 
This massive increase in the public consumption of the arts was sustained by 
printers and publishers, engravers and printsellers, who were linked together 
throughout Europe. Although the influence of the courts, especially in theatre 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Brewer (1997: xvi). 
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and music, remained strong the arts became more commercial and less courtly 
because they were more urban. Artistic taste was considered a sign of refinement, 
cultivation and politeness, qualities which were believed to be nurtured best in 
towns and cities.  
Taste also became the attribute of a new type of person who was literate, able 
to talk about art, literature and music and displayed his refinement through polite 
conversation. This new type of person did not include the urban poor or the 
peasantry who, in any case, lacked the wealth and leisure to enjoy such tastes. 
While women of the appropriate status were also seen as capable of belonging to 
this community of taste, they were excluded from some of its institutions, 
notably clubs and associations. Their domains were of the drawing room and 
salon rather than the taverns or the coffee-houses. Emphatically, taste was not 
confined to the aristocracy. All over Europe artisans, merchants, shopkeepers, 
farmers, lawyers, doctors and more bought books and prints, and attended plays 
and concerts. The fine arts, in short, were viewed as one of the characteristic 
features of the modern commercial and urban society.  
Interestingly from the point of view of the relationship between art and 
technology, the growth and spread of the arts was seen as intimately tied to the 
practical and technological improvements of the new commercial society and a 
sign of how civilised a nation had become. The same age which produces great 
philosophers, generals, poets and painters also produces skilful craftsmen. 
However, while the period enables a literate and urbane class to enjoy the 
unprecedented supply of artistic creation, it also marginalised forms of popular 
expression such as ballads, folk song, woodcuts and seasonal festivals. These 
were viewed, on the one hand, as the primitive expressions of an earlier stage of 
social development and, accordingly, as society advanced would vanish and, on 
the other, as insufficiently refined so that they were condemned as vulgar.1
Of course, it was to be some decades before the full realisation of these 
changes was to become firmly institutionalised. Even during the eighteenth 
century, modern English painters were highly marginalised figures dismissed as 
‘mechanics’ performing a ‘servile’ art. Writers, too, were little better off and 
widely regarded as ‘drudges of the pen’. Nevertheless, the longer term 
consequences of these changes which were to work themselves through over the 
next century or more, were to be profound for the current ways in which we think 
about the relationship between art and technology.  
However, such an approach seemingly relegates ‘the aesthetic’ also to being 
a social construction, rendering aesthetic judgements as if not exactly 
expressions of personal taste then expressions of cultural preference and, as such, 
a happenstance of history and social conditioning. Finding Mozart’s Requiem 
moving is as much a cultural preference as is a liking for fish and chips. Both are 
contingent on being a member of a particular culture and society.  
                                                 
1 There was a reaction to these sentiments and doubts about the beneficence of wealth. See Brewer (1997) 
for further details. 
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Revisiting the aesthetic 
A sociological view on art would seem, on the face of it, to put the final nail in 
the coffin of views which have attempted to bring some objectivity to aesthetic 
judgements through trying to identify some property or quality possessed by 
artistic productions or natural objects. If art is subject to wider social and cultural 
influences, as indeed is aesthetics itself, this also seemingly implies that aesthetic 
judgements are subjective in being expressions of cultural taste. Aesthetic 
judgements are relative judgements and no more than that.  
However, for us such a conclusion misconstrues the logical grammar of 
aesthetic judgements and, moreover, misconstrues the force of social 
constructionism by elevating it to an ontology rather than a methodological point 
of view.1 Although a fuller discussion of the issues here would take us too far 
away from the concerns of this Deliverable, suffice it to say, by way of summary, 
that what is ignored is the sense that aesthetic judgements have in ordinary 
language use and, as part of this, the place they have in the orderly affairs of the 
members of society.  
Aesthetic expressions, to use this rather general phrase, invoke standards of 
appraisal. Standards, which are conventional in the sense that they are not, so to 
speak, given in nature but are public. They constitute the publicly available 
grounds upon which appraisals and judgements are exercised in social activities 
ranging from games and sports, to legal decisions, to morality and, our special 
concern, art.2
An analogy here might help. The rules of soccer, for example, are 
conventional in that they could have been otherwise – and in the past have been 
otherwise and, no doubt, will be in the future. But the results of a soccer match 
are objective in any reasonable sense of the word. The rules of the game, the 
conventions, do not determine the outcome, as it were. This is a matter of how 
well the game is played and in the context of the application of the rules. So it is 
with aesthetic standards. The application of a standard, in whatever domain, 
cannot simply be a matter of personal preference or taste in the sense described 
earlier. It makes sense to discuss and debate, argue over, disagree with, etc. some 
particular judgement as to the merit, or otherwise, of something to which a 
standard applies. 
Accordingly, aesthetic standards are public matters which can and are used to 
evaluate artistic productions. The fact that such standards may be rather less 
precise than the rules of soccer does not affect the argument. Having said this, 
however, there are one or two points that are worth mentioning about aesthetic 
standards since they are germane to the discussion. 
                                                 
1 The notion of ‘logical grammar’ here is derived from Wittgenstein’s views on ordinary language and what 
it makes sense to say. It has little or no relationship to logic as this is commonly understood or to 
grammar as this is understood in traditional linguistics. 
2 See Goodman (1968). 
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Aesthetic standards, like moral standards, are not the sole preserve of artists 
of whatever medium but can be invoked by anyone and in any context. As 
expressions of taste and appraisal they are statements of ‘where one stands’ in 
terms of something’s beauty, attractiveness, charm, splendour, sublimity, etc. It 
is to state an attitude toward something in terms of its aesthetic qualities. It is, of 
course, open to others to disagree, and to disagree with reason. That is, to adduce 
support for the judgement by invoking whatever qualities the proponent might 
deem relevant. How successful this might turn out to be would depend on the 
persuasiveness of the arguments and how effectively they are put. However, in 
the end, if persuasion is not effective and agreement on the aesthetic worth of 
something is not forthcoming, then it will remain a matter of having different 
tastes as to what it is one appreciates.  
The point of drawing attention to and reinforcing this feature of aesthetic 
appraisal – and it is not unique in this – is that despite the fact that there are no 
‘objective’ standards in the sense in which these are typically required, it still 
makes sense to agree, disagree, argue over, dispute, change one’s mind, etc., in 
reasonable ways. In other words, aesthetic appraisals are not merely matters of 
taste in the way that is often implied in saying that whether one likes vanilla ice 
cream or not is ‘just a matter of taste’. 
However, unlike moral standards, where there are no experts, art is, typically, 
produced through the exercise of skill and expertise gained after a long period of 
training and apprenticeship. In other words, it can be said that acquisition of the 
skill and expertise gives such persons a special license to understand and 
evaluate what some artistic production involves and what an achievement it 
might constitute. It is considerations such as these which introduce the possibility 
– and again it is not unique to aesthetic judgements – of judgements being ‘ill-
informed’, or ‘failing to understand what the artist is trying to convey ’, and so 
on. However, what this suggests is that ‘aesthetic judgements’ are something 
more than expressions of liking or taste even though this may well be a response, 
and a legitimate one at that, to some artistic production. ‘Aesthetic judgements’, 
we might say, require that the judgement be an informed one with this relevant to 
how seriously the judgement is to be taken.1
Learning from artistic traditions 
Given the problematic nature of uncovering common properties of Art that are of 
utility for design it is worth focusing on the process through which different 
artistic endeavours have been undertaken and what we may learn from this. In 
fact, this very reflection on the nature of artistic production provided a theme of 
the work of the first year of the project and is reported in the field studies of the 
work of ZKM reported last year. In this section we wish to reflect on these 
                                                 
1 Of course, how well the judgement is ‘informed’ and by what may well be an issue for appraisers and part 
of the debate about some work of art.  
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traditions as a potential candidate for providing a bridge between Art and 
Technology. 
Earlier we referred to the way in which, around the eighteenth century in Europe, 
artistic production began to gain an autonomy it had not had previously. One 
result of this cultural shift was to bring to the fore the extent to which distinct 
artistic endeavours had their own traditions and conventions which, though not 
unconnected to the wider society and culture, to a significant degree possessed 
their own internal impetus. By this we mean that other artists work figures  
significantly in the undertaking of artistic work. 
The dominant motif of artistic practise is what Norman (1998) refers to as 
‘reactive switches in thinking’ in which artists and schools succeed one another 
largely through a process of reaction to previous artists and schools.1 Norman 
(1998) notes that even in the brief period of western art history, definitions and 
practices vary considerably, and in ways which amount to ‘reactive switches’. 
Thus, and to use her own examples, the English Romantic loners of the 19th 
century were succeeded by Ruskin’s and Morris’s ideals of anonymous arts and 
craft workers. Parallel to this movement, in France the academicians were 
supplanted by a group of anti-academic outdoor enthusiasts who launched the 
Impressionist movement.  
This not only means that aesthetic standards, and hence judgements, can 
change but also that there are standards which are very much internal to the 
traditions themselves and which cannot be easily understood outside of them. 
Indeed, there is more than a little truth in the adage that artists tend to produce 
their work for other artists rather than for the general public.  
Such ‘reactive switches’ have much of the character of what Kuhn refers to 
in the entirely different context of scientific change as a ‘paradigm shift’ (Kuhn, 
1970).2 That is, a major change in the fundamentals of existing practise. In other 
words, it is open to artists to abandon ‘received wisdom’ and challenge what is to 
count, for any particular art, as an artistic achievement. Indeed, it is plausible to 
regard ‘interactive art’, which is of especial interest here, as challenging 
‘received wisdom’ in just this way by mediating the experience of art and 
immersing the spectators in the artefact so that they are not longer ‘mere 
spectators’. The analogies between this shift and the use of the term 'paradigm 
shift' in technology is more than a passing resemblance. Much of the 
revolutionary rhetoric of new technological innovations has considerable 
similarities to those observed in the emergence of these new artistic traditions.   
                                                 
1 See, for example in interactive art, Shaw’s (1998) account of the genesis and rationale of The Legible 
City.  
2 The arts may well vary in the extent to which they are prone to such ‘reactive switches’. 
Impressionistically, it seems that the plastic arts are more prone to these than literature or drama. 
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Revisiting art and technology 
As should be clear so far from the discussion, while we have no quarrel in 
principle with the ambition to establish closer links between the art worlds and 
that of design, there are aspects of this which leads us to cavil with some of the 
presumptions behind the way in which the issue is typically posed, some of 
which have already been aired above. Moreover, our doubts are not sheer 
academic pedantry but, as we hope to show later, important for realising the 
ambition which the initial question sets out. We might say that one of the 
important tasks here is trying to get a clearer sight of just what the question 
amounts to as a practical endeavour rather than remaining as an abstract 
intellectual puzzle.  
The original question posed about the relationship between Art and 
Technology contains a further presumption, namely, it assumes that there is an 
issue here, a problem which needs a solution. It presumes, to put it another way, 
that there is currently a separation between these two domains and that this is 
something to regret. Hence, the idea that ways should be found in overcoming 
the distance between them to their mutual benefit. However, as discussed 
previously, it was the eighteenth century, in Europe at least, which saw, on the 
one hand, a growth in the consumption of the arts and a consequent elevation in 
the status of the artist and, on the other hand, a developing sense of the arts as a 
distinct sphere of cultural activity. As we pointed out, it took some decades for 
these processes to work themselves out to their fullest extent, but our major focus 
here is with the sense of the arts as a distinct field of activity divided from other 
activities, especially science and technology. 
There are strong echoes of this current preoccupation with a similar issue that 
emerged during the 1950s and 1960s in regard to science and art. C.P. Snow’s, 
The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959) was seminal in setting out 
what came to be seen as a major problem of our age, namely, the separation of 
art and science to the detriment of science especially. In brief, the argument was, 
and it has been reiterated in various forms since, that science needed 
‘humanising’ to better serve the interests of society rather than the narrow ones 
of science and technology. At the time the argument was a persuasive one and, in 
the United Kingdom for one, resulted in none too successful curricula 
experiments to broaden the outlook of science students.1 Irrespective of whether 
or not encouraging scientists and technologists to read novels, visit the theatre 
and art galleries, or attend courses in Jane Austen would ever have the desired 
effect of ‘humanising’ these disciplines, the point is that it reflected a strong 
feeling that art, and science and technology, were worlds apart and that this was 
to be regretted and, if possible, changed. A similar sentiment, we suggest, lies 
                                                 
1 Efforts to broaden the outlook of arts students by making them more aware of science were even less 
successful.  
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behind the kind of question about the relationship between Art and Technology 
that prompts this and other research initiatives.  
However, for our part, we find that the issue and its proposed solutions, have 
an air of unreality about them, although having said this, its importance as a 
widespread sentiment within our culture is not to be gainsaid. As we have 
already outlined in the previous sections, this is a state of affairs which has been 
inherited from the changes which gained momentum in the eighteenth century. 
To describe it as a problem, of the way we happen to think about art and 
technology, is not to minimise it. It ought, however, to encourage us to look 
rather more closely at the relationship. 
In an earlier section we suggested that Art and Technology were glosses for a 
tremendous variety of activities, a point at that juncture of the discussion mainly 
to do with the logical grammar of general formulations.1 Here we want to focus 
more on the consequences of acknowledging this variety of activities giving 
special attention to art and technology-in-use. The use of the term ‘technology-
in-use’ is intended to encourage a look beneath, as it were, the idea that the 
cultures of art and technology are distinct and separate domains. In doing so we 
hope to bring out the extent to which art and technology are already, and have 
always been, intimately associated.  
To a large extent the approach to the question is obscured by the social and 
cultural changes alluded to earlier. If we return, for a moment, to the period prior 
to the eighteenth century we can perhaps obtain a clearer picture of the 
relationship between art and technology. Then, and again we are speaking of 
European experience, the status of the artist was of craftsman, artisan and 
belonged not so much to an independent domain of art but to trade and the 
‘commoner’ activities.2 The acquisition of the skills of a craft was through a 
prolonged apprenticeship, often closely controlled and regulated by guild 
associations. Not only were the skills acquired those of the relevant trade but 
were also closely intertwined with what we would now describe as aesthetic 
elements. Nor was this surprising given that the main market for the output of the 
craft was, in the main and prior to the development of mass markets, aristocratic 
patrons, the court, the church and the municipality.  
In other words, no sharp distinction was drawn between the artist and the 
craftsman. (Indeed, the lowly status of the artist can be traced fairly directly to 
the fact that he – and they were mainly male – was a craftsman and had to earn a 
living by using these skills). The medieval master builder, for one example, was 
responsible not only for realising the building as a construction, but also for 
whatever aesthetic qualities it came to have. Indeed, the kind of specialist 
divisions between, say, engineering, craft, technology, artist, etc., that are so 
familiar to us would be difficult to apply in quite the same way to earlier periods 
of our history. The point is that from the point of view of the activities involved, 
                                                 
1 On glosses see Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) and Heritage and Watson (1977). 
2 For an excellent discussion of relevant issues to the changes in the status of the arts, see Hall (1998). 
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it would be difficult to identify, and separate out, those activities which were 
artistic and those which were technical, to put it simply.  
Certainly, and again from the point of view of technology-in-use, it is not 
difficult to appreciate the craft elements that not only must have gone into the 
production of art but continue to be so. From the beginning, for example, 
painting has had to develop tools and technological knowledge of, to mention but 
a few, the creation of pigments and colours, understand how to reproduce the 
effects of light and shade, and sculptors discover ways to work marble, stone or 
clay, use heat to bend metals, and more. The history of artistic endeavour is as 
much a history of technology as it is of aesthetic production.  
However, as we have already pointed out, we cannot dismiss the distinction 
between art and technology as entirely without point or substance, as merely 
some cultural misconception. The social changes already described as well as 
others involved in the move of European societies toward industrialism have 
wrought significant changes in the place of art, engineering, technology, and 
science in our society and our culture. For one, the perceived division between 
the arts and the sciences discussed earlier does have its institutional expressions, 
not least in the education and training of the respective practitioners. Engineering 
cannot now be mastered through an apprenticeship but requires a high degree of 
theoretical knowledge as well as, sometimes, practical experience. It has become 
a discipline – or set of disciplines – no longer a craft. The training of artists, 
though more variable than in the case of engineering, is also more 
‘professionalised’ and though inevitably retaining important craft elements does 
not require routine exposure to engineering theory as a requirement for the 
practise of the artistic endeavour.  
An important change which needs to be noted is that with the growth of mass 
markets and mass consumption, artistic products, to use this clumsy term for the 
moment, have become more available than ever. This has not only involved an 
expansion of the number of artistic consumers of books, prints, video, museums 
and galleries, etc., but also an increase in the number of producers as well as the 
domains which are now seen as among the arts. Film, television, and radio, for 
example, are just the more prominent of the media which can now be included 
among the arts. People training in the arts are also involved in a variety of 
industrial and commercial activities in advertising, TV production, 
manufacturing of all kinds, architecture, theatre design, fashion, and so on. 
Despite this unprecedented extension of talents and skills which can plausibly be 
regarded as involving the aesthetic, the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ taste 
with regard to art and its products remains: a distinction which can be 
instantiated in so many ways and which both reinforces and complicates the 
divide between art and technology as distinct spheres of activity.1
                                                 
1 It can also create tensions within organisations where it is often difficult for artists and engineers to work 
together while retaining a strong sense of their own identity. See Norman (1998) for a discussion of such 
issues. 
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The ‘aesthetically decorative’ and ‘aesthetically informed’ 
In the last years exploration of the relation between art and technology, Norman 
(1998) draws a distinction between the ‘aesthetically decorative’ and the 
‘aesthetically informed’. Essentially, this is a difference, which is to do with the 
contribution of the artist. An example would be the case of engineers developing 
innovative computer tools and seeing the artist as someone ‘adding value’ to the 
product by differentiating it from that of competitors. This would be to regard art 
as ornamental or decorative rather than an integral part of the development 
process. It is a form of window-dressing helping to make what might otherwise 
be dull, austere, obscure, etc. more accessible and palatable. While by no means 
unimportant, such a role is not the one envisaged for eSCAPE.  
Norman (1998) goes on to support the conception of the artist’s role as that of 
a ‘poetic interpreter’ of life’s mysteries cultivating an awareness of those aspects 
of human existence which are prone to radical transformations. The most 
important quality here is that of creativity and ‘interpretative energies’. 
Unfortunately, it is this role which is the most incomprehensible to non-
specialists, including potential technological collaborators. The ‘aesthetically 
decorative’ is much more approachable and understandable than is the radically 
challenging. Be this as it may, for eSCAPE one of the important themes is to try 
to gain experience, and derive lessons from, bringing the challenges that can be 
posed by the ‘aesthetically informed’ to bear on the conception of electronic 
landscapes.  
Although there are problems about the distinction especially if pressed too 
strongly – such as how we might systematically distinguish the ‘aesthetically 
decorative’ from the ‘aesthetically informed: is a reproduction picture of a Van 
Gogh in someone’s living room merely decorative? – nonetheless, as a thought 
provoking couple of phrases they do take us forward.  
What is being suggested is that an important aspect of artistic work is to 
challenge existing conceptions whatever these may be – the ‘poetic interpreter’, 
as it were. There needs to be some caution exercised here in that we are using a 
highly general category without specifying the kind of art. However, and it is an 
important point, these inspirations often have their sense from within artistic 
traditions, and artistic traditions alone.  
The aesthetically informed and interactive art 
Artists, in most if not all domains, have never been slow to make use of new 
technologies and media. One has only to take note of film, radio and television, 
the use of acrylics and plastics and, earlier, photography and printing not to 
mention the untold technological innovations throughout the history of art and 
artistic production. So, it is no surprise that artists should turn to the computer as 
the latest technology for exploring the means of artistic expression and for 
‘poetic interpretation’.  
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However, an argument can be made that the networked computer represents a 
very different technological medium than previous technologies in its very 
flexibility and ubiquity for imaginatively exploring the limits of human 
experiences in much the same way that earlier printing did. It is the possibility of 
creating virtual worlds which has been seized upon by many cultural 
commentators as likely to become the defining feature of the ‘post-modern’ age. 
Such possibilities putatively challenge the very foundations upon which our  
‘modern’ experience is built by creating conceptions of space, time, identity, 
subjectivity, community which owe nothing to the world built out of the hard 
won visions of the Enlightenment.1  
Placing on one side the hype which infects much of this kind of thinking, it 
does appear that there is an interesting coalescence of one of the main objectives 
of art and technological possibility which makes, perhaps, for a closer affinity 
between art and the design of technologies. The task is to explore, and work 
through, what this can mean. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we have reviewed some background considerations relevant to the 
eSCAPE strategy which will be elaborated more fully in the following chapter. 
Much of the review has concerned itself with issues to do with the nature of art 
and what relevance it might have for the design of technological systems. While 
expressing serious doubts about raising the question of the relationship between 
Art and Technology as a general question requiring a general answer, we have 
tried to move toward being able to state a more specific but practically realisable 
position which neither denigrates artistic endeavour nor technological design. 
We do not pretend in what follows that we have, once and for all, resolved all the 
problems here. After all, all that we are attempting to achieve here is to set out 
the strategy that has emerged in the course of conducting the project and in 
addressing the contingencies that arose in doing so. 
In addressing the contingent practical problems engendered in the course of 
this particular project’s execution, there are a number of caveats we need to 
mention. The first is that within the practical realisation of the project, the team 
has been dealing with a specific collection of artworks, namely interactive art 
works, so there needs to be some hesitancy in generalising from the studies to be 
reported. Second, and we will discuss this a little more fully in the next chapter, 
we shall not be making aesthetic judgements about particular works of art. These, 
from our point of view, are matters for the artistic traditions themselves. Third, 
we are not subscribing to a point of view which sees art as the only source of 
                                                 
1 Again, a great deal of caution needs to be exercised when considering such claims. As Button (1991: 4) 
reminds us ‘theories about the cultural transformation of society, may challenge existing bodies of 
thought, but they do not challenge the very foundational act of theorising. Findings may be challenged 
but the methodological foundations through which those findings are generated remains intact’. Ergo, 
under the auspices of ‘post-modern’ inquiry, the foundations of the ‘modern’ project remain intact.  
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creativity in the design of innovative virtual reality systems. Few artists, we are 
confident, would subscribe to such a view. Though artistic production offers a 
possibly unparalleled opportunity to explore experience in ways which would 
not, typically, be open to the technical designer, this is as much a comment about 
the kind of attentiveness required by the respective work roles as it is about 
imagination. 
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